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Abstract
Export cartels are exempted from the competition laws of most countries. While
some scholars and several WTO members have recently condemned such
cartels, others have argued that they allow efficiency gains that actually
promote competition and trade. This paper examines the various issues
involved, with special reference to developing countries and to recent
discussions on trade and competition policy. After summarising the contending
views on export cartels, and also the scanty theoretical literature on the subject,
it reviews the treatment of such cartels in various jurisdictions and the limited
empirical evidence that is available on their prevalence, efficiency justifications,
and effects on international trade. Insights from economic theory are then
applied to the arguments for and against export cartels, suggesting criteria that
could help to determine their validity and an importing country’s best response.
The paper concludes that while importing countries should evaluate foreign
export cartels under a “rule of reason”, most of them will be constrained by a
lack of technical expertise and limited enforcement capacity. It suggests a
novel approach, based on parallels with anti-dumping procedures, which would
strengthen their hands.
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I.  Introduction
International cartels have attracted much attention in recent years, with
competition (antitrust) agencies in the European Union and the United States
having successfully prosecuted over forty such cartels during the 1990s.
Studies commissioned by the OECD (2003a, Part II), the WTO Secretariat
(Evenett, 2003), and the World Bank (revised version in Levenstein et al, 2003)
summarise the statistical evidence generated by these cases, and present
estimates of the losses incurred by consumers in other countries, especially
developing ones, as a result of the cartels’ activities.  And yet, despite the
growing concern over international cartels comprising firms based in different
countries, much less attention has been paid to export cartels based in only
one country and implicitly or explicitly exempted from its competition laws.  The
three international studies cited above, for example, mentioned them only in
passing.  Many antitrust scholars as well as country representatives have
recently called for abolishing such exemptions in the context of discussions at
the WTO on a possible agreement on competition policy, but there have also
been forceful dissenting views claiming that export cartels actually promote
efficiency, trade, and competition.  All these conflicting views, as we shall see
below, have been based on simple assertions about the benign or malign
effects of export cartels, without adequate theoretical or empirical foundations.
This is not a happy state of affairs.  Even though, after the failure of the
Cancun Ministerial conference, competition policy now appears to be a
moribund issue at the WTO, inexperienced competition agencies in the dozens
of countries that have recently enacted competition laws will need to
understand the impact that foreign export cartels might have on their
economies. Knee-jerk condemnation, or for that matter, unquestioning
acceptance of efficiency arguments, will encourage distortions in international
trade, whether through the actions of private parties or of governments trying to
oppose them.  This paper explores the issues involved. Section 2 summarises
the contending views on export cartels, and also the scanty theoretical
literature on the subject.  Section 3 reviews the exemptions granted to export
cartels in various jurisdictions and the limited empirical evidence that is
available on their prevalence, efficiency justifications, and effects on2
international trade.  Section 4 recounts the efficiency claims made by one U.S.
export association that ran afoul of antitrust agencies in four different
jurisdictions during the 1990s, and the reasons given by those agencies for
rejecting them.  Section 5 applies basic economic principles to the efficiency
arguments of the preceding sections, suggesting criteria that could help to
determine their validity and an importing country’s best response.  On the basis
of this analysis, Section 6 concludes that while importing countries should
evaluate foreign export cartels under a “Rule of Reason”, most of them will be
hampered by their lack of technical expertise and limited enforcement capacity.
It suggests a novel approach, based on parallels with anti-dumping procedures,
which would strengthen their hands.
2.  Contending Views
A.  Academic Arguments
Economic theory has long recognised that restricting exports via cartelization is
an optimal policy for a country with market power in foreign markets, but this is
tempered by two considerations.  First, consumers in the exporting country are
adversely affected, unless there is no domestic consumption of the exported
product, or cartelization of export sales can be separated from competition in
the domestic market.
1  Second, such a policy is mutually welfare-reducing if
practised by several countries simultaneously.  The case for rules governing
export cartels should therefore be at least as strong as for other “beggar-thy-
neighbour” trade policies such as tariffs and export subsidies, which are the
staple fare of trade agreements. Yet, economic theorists have paid little
attention to this issue, despite an outpouring of research on the interaction of
trade and competition policy in the context of discussions at the WTO.
Several leading international antitrust and trade policy specialists have,
however, recently called for a WTO agreement on competition that would
incorporate the fundamental principle of National Treatment (NT), or non-
discrimination between domestic and foreign parties.  They see abolition of
                                                          
1 For formal oligopoly models, see Auquier and Caves (1979), Dixit (1984), and Brander and
Spencer (1984).  This is related to a much older argument according to which a country with
monopoly power in the export market for a product, but with competitive producers who are
unable to exploit it, can use cartelization as an alternative to an export  tax in order to improve
its terms of trade by restricting exports.3
export cartel exemptions as the most obvious benefit arising out of the adoption
of this principle.  For example, Trebilcock et al (2002, p.675), regard the
exemption as “myopic”, in that although it might enhance a country’s national
income in the short run, it encourages “a downward spiral or beggar-thy-
neighbour dynamic through reciprocal measures that in the long-run reduce
both national and global welfare”.  Removal of these exemptions, according to
them, would be the easiest application of the NT principle. Guzman (2003,
pp.40-42), while recognizing that de jure NT in an antitrust statute does not
preclude de facto discrimination in its enforcement, acknowledges that NT
would at least get rid of the export cartel exemption.  Hoekman and Mavroidis
(2003, pp.19-21) go further, calling for an outright ban on export cartels by
developed countries, supplemented by a commitment by them to devote
resources to active prosecution of their own firms who might violate the ban.
This would allow developing countries that lack extra-territorial enforcement
capability to “outsource” enforcement, in exchange for which they could offer
greater market access to developed-country exports.
On the other hand, Holmes et al (2003, p.69) remind us that “Domestic
competition laws are jurisdictional with regard to effects on the domestic
territory …. As such, they act to address both foreign and domestic practices,
but only as these practices affect competition upon the domestic market.  Since
national competition laws are not drawn to treat the external … effects of
domestic policies, territories stating explicit “exclusions” from treating the
external effects of domestic practices (export cartels) are really no different
from the territories that do not state such an explicit exclusion.”  They further
point out that GATT Article III (concerning NT) is limited to non-discrimination
between domestic and foreign goods competing on the member’s internal
market.  “This means that [NT] imposes no obligation upon a Member to
consider the manner in which domestic laws affect the external sale of
domestic products.” (ibid, n.22).  Incorporating NT into a competition agreement
would not, on this reading, result in export cartels becoming subject to the
competition laws of their home jurisdictions; much more specific language
would be required.4
Yet other scholars oppose a blanket prohibition of export cartels.  Singh
(2003, p.29) objects to NT itself, on the grounds that developing countries need
a lax competition policy to enable their firms to reap economies of scale to
compete on an equal footing with multinational corporations.  He argues that
developed countries should on their own initiative crack down on the anti-
competitive activities of firms based in their jurisdiction that have a harmful
effect on developing countries, without expecting the latter countries to take
similar actions against their own firms.  More pragmatically, Scherer (2000,
pp.395-403) acknowledges that most countries would be reluctant to prohibit
cartels in commodities which are major sources of export earnings, and
recommends that any agreement should allow each country to exempt export
cartels (or participation in international cartels) in upto three industries, defined
at the four-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classification.  This
proposal is deliberately biased in favour of developing countries, whose exports
are typically concentrated in a narrow range of commodities.  He argues that
their industrialization would be facilitated by an agreement that would
discourage cartelization by suppliers of raw materials, equipment and
technology based in developed countries.  But he also makes a qualified case
for permitting developing countries to maintain cartels in industries producing
manufactured exports, to allow for economies of scale, coordinated marketing,
financing of technology development, and even coordinated export pricing so
as to avoid charges of dumping in foreign markets.  Finally, Davidow and
Shapiro (2003, pp.66-67), while supporting a WTO agreement on competition
policy, point out that outright condemnation of export cartels is uncalled for, on
the grounds that they may conduce to cost reduction and risk sharing, and that
a cartel’s market share in its export market would be much smaller than in the
domestic market.
B.  Country Positions
The lack of consensus in the academic community is reflected in the
contending positions of WTO members.  In submissions to the WTO Working
Group on Trade and Competition Policy, several WTO members had criticised
the exemption of export cartels in national competition laws.  According to the5
EC, such cartels “had a clear distortionary effect on international trade as well
as a harmful impact on development”, while the Japanese submission went
further:
Since export cartels usually have a small impact on domestic
markets, competition authorities, in general, are not in a
position to regulate them.  Even if they are, there still remains
the problem of whether they are able to regulate, under
national laws, practices that do not necessarily affect their
domestic market.  In addition, it is generally difficult for the
authorities of importing countries to regulate such cartels.
Nevertheless, export cartels do distort trade. It would be most
significant, therefore, under such circumstances, if the WTO,
a multilateral body for international trade, can consider a
common regulation against them, including even their
prohibition.
2
Significantly, the EC and Japan were the major proponents of a WTO
agreement on competition policy.  In practical terms, the EC position did not
amount to much, because it did not envisage an agreement that would provide
for anything more than consultations and voluntary cooperation with the
authorities of other jurisdictions, while NT would continue to exclude such
cartels from their own laws (Holmes et al, 2003).
Several developing countries, including those opposed to an agreement,
joined in the condemnation of export cartels.  Trinidad and Tobago (on behalf
of CARICOM, the Caribbean Economic Community) as well as Brazil drew
attention to the harm that they inflicted, especially on developing countries.
3
While expressing similar views, Thailand, India, China, Indonesia and Egypt
invoked the principle of “Special and Differential Treatment” to argue that
developing countries should be allowed to continue to exempt their export
                                                          
2 WTO documents WT/WGTCP/M/12 (Minutes of the Working Group meeting of 2-3 October 2000),
paragraphs 10 and 25; and WT/WGTCP/W/156 (Communication from Japan, 19 December 2000).
3 See, respectively, WT/WGTCP/M/12 (Minutes of the meeting of 2-3 October 2000) and
WT/WGTCP/M/22 (Minutes of the meeting of 26-27 May 2003), paragraph 25.6
cartels, on the grounds that they were made up mainly of smaller firms, while
requiring developed countries to abolish their exemptions.
4
The United States, however, argued that export cartels can result in
efficiency benefits that promote trade, and in these cases “such arrangements
clearly had pro-competitive effects. Care was therefore required in discussing
arrangements currently characterized as export cartels which did not, in fact,
necessarily have the same effects as hard core cartels.”
5  “Hard core” cartels,
according to the widely followed definition in the 1998 OECD Recommendation
that called for international cooperation to deal with them, are anticompetitive
agreements, arrangements or concerted practices by competitors to fix prices,
rig bids, restrict outputs, or share markets.  However, the same
Recommendation specifically excluded “agreements, concerted practices, or
arrangements that i) are reasonably related to the lawful realisation of cost-
reducing or output-enhancing efficiencies, ii) are excluded directly or indirectly
from the coverage of a Member country’s own laws, or iii) are authorised in
accordance with those laws” (see OECD 2003a, Annex B).  Because export
cartels, as I shall show in the next section, are exempted one way or the other
in most OECD countries, they would fall under one or more of these clauses.
A catalogue of exemptions from national competition laws compiled by
the WTO Secretariat found that that, despite the concern expressed by several
members regarding exemption of export cartels, “only one country, namely
Japan, is noted as having been identified (sic) a specific exemption for export
cartels in its national legislation”.
6  This list was gleaned from members’ own
submissions describing their competition laws, and evidently they were
reluctant to disclose exemptions that could work against their trade partners.
                                                          
4 See, respectively, WT/WGTCP/W/213/Rev.1 (Communication from Thailand, 26 September
2002); WT/WGTCP/W/216 (Communication from India, 26 September 2002); China:
WT/WGTCP/M/19 (Minutes of the meeting of 26-27 September 2002), paragraph 78;
Indonesia: id., paragraph 53; Egypt: WT/WGTCP/M/22 (Minutes of the meeting of 27-27 May
2003), paragraph 33.
5 WTO document WT/WGTCP/M/18 (Minutes of the WTO Working Group meeting of 1-2 July
2002), paragraph 44.  The point was reiterated by the United States in its Communication of 15
August 2002 (WT/WGTCP/W/203, at B.7), and at the meeting of 20-21 February 2003
(WT/WGTCP/M/21, paragraph 37).
6  WT/WGTCP/W/172, 6 July 2001 (“Exceptions, Exemptions and Exclusions Contained in Members’
National Competition Legislation”), para 14.  Even WTO Secretariat’s most recent survey of national
competition laws only refers to the earlier document for information on exemptions
(WT/WGTCP/W/128/Rev.3, 27 November 2003).7
With the members of the OECD, representing the world’s dominant economies,
skirting the issue; the U.S. openly questioning its relevance; the EC offering
only voluntary cooperation as developing countries and antitrust scholars
began to call for prohibition; and the Secretariat unable to compile a
comprehensive list, export cartels seemed to be getting sidelined at the WTO
discussions.  It is not surprising therefore, that on the eve of the Cancun
Minsterial, some forty developing countries sought clarifications on, inter alia,
whether the definition of hard-core cartels would cover export cartels.
7  As the
conference ended in failure, the issue remained unresolved.
To sum up, many countries, like most of the antitrust scholars and
economists cited above, saw export cartels only in a competition-restricting role
no different from that of any other cartel. Others saw the possibility of
competition-enhancing efficiencies; others yet saw virtue in their own cartels
and evil in others.  All these opinions were expressed only in passing, in the
course of much broader commentaries on trade and competition policy.
Perhaps in consequence, the contending views took the form of assertions. No
serious empirical or theoretical arguments seem to have been entered at any
stage of the debate, in contrast to the several voluminous studies of
international cartels. The remainder of this paper represents an attempt to sort
out the issues involved.
3.  Prevalence and Legal Treatment
How widespread are export cartels, and how are they dealt with in national
competition laws?  The answers to these questions turn out to be related.
Some jurisdictions provide for specific exemptions, requiring notification or
registration with a government agency.  In such cases, some information about
their prevalence and claims of efficiency becomes available.  Elsewhere,
conduct relating to exports is excluded from the coverage of the national law,
either explicitly, or implicitly by jurisdiction being limited to activities that affect
competition in the domestic market. Consequently, there is little information
about the existence of export cartels.  As the quotations above from Holmes et
al (2003) suggest, an implicit exclusion is as good as an explicit one as far as
                                                          
7 WT/MIN(03)/W/41 dated 4 September 2003 (Communication from 16 developing countries, with8
action by the home authorities is concerned.  A recent OECD background note
on exclusions from competition laws makes a similar point, suggesting that the
explicit provisions for export cartels “are better regarded as clarifications rather
than exclusions” (OECD 2003b, p.3).  Nonetheless, it is useful to get a sense of
where such provisions exist and how they work, particularly in light of the WTO
Secretariat’s inability to compile a list.
Evenett et al (2001) and OECD (2003b) between them list fifteen
countries whose competition laws explicitly or implicitly exclude export cartels.
Of these, Australia and New Zealand require only notification; Japan, Spain
and the United States require authorization; in Canada, Greece and Mexico the
exclusions are explicit; elsewhere it is implicit.  Almost all the countries in these
two compilations are developed countries or economies in transition, and so a
couple of additional examples from developing countries might be helpful.  In
the next section, I shall have occasion to refer to the new competition laws in
India and South Africa in respect of their treatment of foreign export cartels.
Here it is worth mentioning that both allow exemption of their own. Section
3(b)(i) of the 1998 South African Competition Act lists “maintenance or
promotion of exports” as one of the possible grounds for granting an exemption
for a restrictive agreement or practice.  Section 5(ii) of India’s 2002 Competition
Act is a more far-reaching ‘carve-out’: “Nothing in this section [on anti-
competitive agreements] shall restrict … the right of any person to export goods
from India to the extent to which the agreement relates exclusively to the
production, supply, distribution or control of goods or provision of services for
such export.”
Export cartel exemptions in the major industrial countries were implicitly
the targets of the complaints by other WTO members reviewed in the preceding
section, and this calls for more detailed investigation of their laws.  The
European Union operates what I have called an implicit exclusion. Article 81(1)
of the EU Treaty prohibits only those cartels “which may affect trade between
Member States and have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the common market”.  The UK has now moved
in the same direction. Formerly, the 1976 Restrictive Trade Practices Act
                                                                                                                                                                        
Bangladesh signing on behalf of the group of Least Developed Countries).9
provided a specific exclusion for agreements pertaining to exports, and also a
so-called “gateway” through which a restrictive agreement could be condoned if
it could be demonstrated that removal of the restriction would cause a
substantial reduction in exports.  As one commentator put it, “Where
agreements have an exclusively overseas application, then neither the 1976
Act nor the Competition Act 1980 will apply at all.”  (Frazer 1992, p.239).  Both
Acts have now been repealed, and Chapter I of the 1998 Competition Act limits
the cartel prohibition in language identical to the EU Treaty’s, substituting
“within the United Kingdom” for “between Member States” and “within the
common market”. Evenett et al (2001) note that Germany also recently
abolished its registration requirement for export cartels.  Implicit exclusion is
now the norm in the EU: “In principle, an export agreement amongst UK
producers (or groups of producers in other single member states) exclusively to
increase exports to non-EU markets is beyond the reach of Article 81.  For the
same reason a similar agreement amongst enterprises in several member
states dealing solely with exports from the Community would fall outside the
scope of the existing antitrust provisions, although hitherto no test of such a
case has been made” (Utton 2003, p.55).
In the U.S., export cartels are shielded from antitrust action by three
statutes, two of which involve a registration procedure. Consequently, they are
more visible to foreign competition agencies (and private researchers).  The
1918 Webb-Pomerene Act (WPA) gives registered export associations qualified
immunity from Section 7 of the Clayton Act (which regulates mergers) and the
Sherman Act, which otherwise prohibits “Every contract, combination … or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations” (emphasis added).  The WPA covered only associations
engaged solely in export trade, and excluded the export of services. It also left
open the possibility of challenges by the government or private parties on the
grounds that the association had exceeded the scope of its immunity, and this
undermined its popularity (Guzman, 1998, p.1534).
The Export Trading Companies Act (ETCA) of 1982 went some way to
overcoming these limitations.  It enables entities (whether ETCs or not) to apply
for a Certificate of Review (CoR) for specific export-related activities, including10
services, even if exports constitute only a small share of their business.  A CoR
is granted only if the proposed activities do not substantially lessen competition
in the U.S., restrain the export trade of another U.S. exporter, unreasonably
affect prices in the U.S., or result in the resale in the U.S. of the exported goods
and services.  The CoR provides virtual immunity from prosecution by the
government, substantial procedural advantages in cases filed by private
plaintiffs on the grounds that these conditions have not been met, and actual
rather than treble damages if an adverse judgment results in the latter case.
8
In its promotional literature, the U.S. Office of Export Trading Company
Affairs (OETCA), the department that administers the ETCA, lists several
advantages that export joint ventures afford to their members.
9 These include
cost reducing measures such as joint market research, trade shows,
advertising, financing, servicing, and training activities; as well as the ability to
offer a full line of products and to meet foreign non-tariff barriers involving
labelling, packaging and quality control requirements. OETCA also offers as
possible advantages the scope for joint bidding, market sharing, and
coordinated pricing to avoid rivalry between U.S. firms – in short, the elements
of a hard-core cartel that would attract sanctions under antitrust law.  Similar
advantages remain available under the WPA, although the ETCA has further
reduced its popularity: as of June 2003, only twelve Webb-Pomerene
Associations were registered with the FTC.
10
The WPA and ETCA protect U.S. firms from antitrust prosecution
provided that they register themselves or obtain a CoR, respectively.  A third
protective statute, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) was
legislated along with the ETCA in 1982 and covers conduct by other firms as
well, but its ambiguous wording and confusing legislative history have given
rise to variant interpretations.  In recent years, some foreign plaintiffs have
actually succeeded in using the FTAIA to win claims against a U.S. exporters in
two federal appeals courts, while other courts have dismissed similar claims
                                                          
8 ETCA “Guidelines for the Issuance of Export Trade Certificates of Review”
www.it.doc.gov/td/oetca/guidelines.html, accessed on August 9, 2003.
9 “Team Up for Exporting”, www.it.doc.gov/td/oetca/teamup.html, accessed on August 9, 2003.
10 www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/webbpomerene, last accessed on December 6, 2003.11
(Mehra 2002; Levenstein et al 2003).  The situation is likely to remain unclear
until appeals are decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The relative importance of the cost-reducing versus monopoly-
enhancing objectives of an export cartel is crucial from the perspective of the
importing countries, and on this count empirical evidence pertaining to the U.S.
export associations is mixed.  An early study by Larson (1970) found that most
Webb-Pomerene Associations were dominated by large producers and had
formed in industries that were highly concentrated.  Those composed of small
firms and/or in less concentrated industries generally either did not form
common sales agencies (CSAs), which he regarded as essential to obtaining
economies of scale, did not export, or did not function at all.  He concluded that
the Act had little impact on exports, but a substantial anti-competitive effect on
the domestic market, and recommended its repeal.  Similarly, Scherer (1994,
p.45), citing a 1967 FTC study of Webb-Pomerene Associations, argued that
“there are grounds for doubting whether cost saving has been the main
consequence of the … associations actually formed. The Webb-Pomerene
groups have been shown to comprise mainly large firms, not their smaller
bretheren; and a disproportion have originated in relatively highly concentrated
U.S. industries.”
Somewhat contradictory evidence comes from a series of papers by
Dick (1992a, 1996a, 1996b), who used econometric techniques to analyse the
characteristics of over a hundred Webb-Pomerene associations.  He found that
that they were associated with industries that were less concentrated but with a
higher ratio of fixed capital to output, suggesting that scale economies were a
major consideration in their formation.  However, those involving a CSA were
more likely to restrict exports and raise prices, while those without such
centralized arrangements were likely to promote exports through exploiting
economies of scale in marketing. The likelihood of a CSA, in turn, was higher in
cartels with fewer members, producing homogeneous products in which the
U.S. had a high share of the world market. Independently, price-fixing was also
more likely to be stated as the cartel’s primary objective the larger the U.S.
market share and the industry’s capital intensity. CSAs increased cartels’
longevity, but price-fixing tended to decrease it.12
Considerations of confidentiality restricted Dick’s data to cartels that
operated between 1918 and 1965.  More recent, but less rigorous, evidence
comes from a 1993 OECD study of 94 US export trading companies which
showed that “only four engaged in foreign government liaison, nine in joint
promotion activities, four in promotion of a U.S. region, four in warranty service,
and seven in project coordination.  Thirty-seven fixed prices, thirty-six
coordinated bids, and fourteen allocated customers.” (Scherer 1994, p.45).  In
other words, most of them acted as hard-core cartels.
Japan also used to give explicit exemption to export cartels.  A study by
Nagaoka (1998) showed that 200 or more such exemptions were in force each
year throughout the 1960s.  The numbers declined appreciably over the next
two decades, but remained above 50 until 1988, with many cartels being
organised to administer Voluntary Export Restraints at the behest of importing
countries.  During the 1990s exemptions were scaled down drastically, and
according to the latest (2002) WTO Trade Policy Review for Japan, there are
none in force at present.
11 Dick (1992b) examined the Japanese export cartels
in their heyday, and found that most of them did not appear to affect export
prices or volumes; if anything, they contributed to cost reduction and quality
assurance in some cases.
The available evidence on export cartels, then, is both dated and
inconclusive, and often relies excessively on their own stated objectives.  In
order to provide a clearer focus with more recent case-study evidence, and to
get a sense of how competition authorities in importing countries might
respond, I recount the attempts by one particular Webb-Pomerene CSA, the
American Natural Soda Ash Corporation (ANSAC), to break into three different
markets and retain its dominant position in a fourth.  I review the efficiency
arguments made by ANSAC and the reasons given by the competition
agencies of the importing countries for rejecting them. In doing so, I shall ignore
the many other procedural and jurisdictional issues as well as allegations of
predatory pricing that were raised but not pursued in some of the cases.
                                                          
11 WT/TPR/S/107 (“Trade Policy Review Body - Trade Policy Review - Japan - Report by the
Secretariat”), paragraph 65.13
4.  A Case Study and its Lessons
Soda ash, or sodium carbonate, is used in the manufacture of glass,
detergents, and paper.  It can be produced by either of two processes: the
synthetic Solvay process, developed in the nineteenth century and now used
worldwide, or by the processing of trona ore, which is the method used by all
but one of the U.S. producers.  The latter process is far more economical in
terms of both energy and labour inputs, but the bulk of US trona deposits are
located far inland, in the states of Wyoming and Colorado, making transport
costs an important determinant of international competitiveness.  US production
consistently exceeds domestic consumption; hence the attempts of the
American industry to break into foreign markets.  The American soda ash
industry was a prime candidate for cartelization.  It produced a non-durable
homogeneous product with a few producers and a significant share of the world
market.  In addition, the firms were located in close proximity to each other and
the ore deposits, and therefore had similar costs of production and
transportation.
12  In 1983, the six American producers formed ANSAC, an
export trading company registered under the Webb-Pomerene Act.
A.  European Community
13
ANSAC’s first encounter with foreign competition law occurred in the late
1980s.  The individual American soda ash firms’ attempts to supply the EEC
had received a setback when price undertakings and anti-dumping duties were
imposed in 1983, resulting in a sharp decline in sales, and the exit of all but one
of them from the European market.  Routing exports through ANSAC would
mean confronting the clear prohibition of Article 85(1) (later renumbered 81(1)
and quoted in the preceding section).  In the 1988 Wood Pulp decision, the
European Court of Justice had dismissed the American defendants’ contention
that their registration as a Webb-Pomerene association gave them immunity on
the basis of the “act of state” doctrine. The Court rejected this defence,
                                                                                                                                                                        
12 Conforming to the predictions of cartel theory, the sole firm using a different raw material (lake brines)
and in a different location (California) recently gave notice of withdrawing from ANSAC because it had an
advantage in proximity to west coast ports (USGS Minerals Yearbook 2002, p.71.3,accessed from:
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals /pubs/commodity/soda_ash/ sodamyb02.pdf).
13 This account is based on Commission Decision 91/301/EEC, Official Journal of the European
Communities L152, 15 June 1991, pp.54-60.14
“asserting that Webb-Pomerene associations are only allowed and not required
by U.S. law, and therefore the act of state non-interference principle did not
hold”.
14
With this precedent, ANSAC attempted a different tack. In December
1988, it notified its arrangements to the Commission to clear the way for its
members to sell jointly rather than severally.  The Commission had, in its
Regulation 17 of 1962, set up a system for examining agreements that might
violate Article 85(1).  This allowed the parties to apply for negative clearance or
alternatively an exemption under Article 85(3) (now 81(3)), which permits what
amounts to an efficiency defence of a restrictive agreement, subject to the
conditions that it allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, does
not impose restrictions that are unnecessary to the efficiency objective, and
does not allow for substantial elimination of competition.  In attempting to meet
this standard, ANSAC contended that its proposed entry into the EEC would
enhance competition.  It also claimed that it was not a cartel, but a dedicated
sales organization, and so 85(1) would not apply.  Alternatively, it sought an
exemption under 85(3) on the grounds that it would be able to achieve
economies of scale in avoiding the duplication of overhead costs of setting up
separate distribution facilities; change the oligopolistic structure of the EEC
market; and offer its customers greater security in supplies and lower prices.  In
the course of the hearing, a senior ANSAC official also demonstrated that the
lower distribution costs would, after calculating back from the ex-warehouse
price, allow it to show a higher nominal ex-works price than an individual
American producer, enabling it to escape the charge of dumping.
15
Rejecting these arguments, the Commission held that even though
ANSAC was constituted as a separate corporate entity, its membership
agreement had as its object and likely effect the restriction of competition,
bringing it under Article 85(1). Past sales activities showed that the individual
producers could compete in the European market, and should be able to do so
                                                          
14 As paraphrased in Scherer (1994), p.48.
15 Dumping occurs when a product is exported at a price that is lower than the price charged in the
exporter’s domestic market, or below a constructed measure of costs. This comparison creates a difficulty
when prices are quoted at the point of delivery, because comparability requires that the export price be
ex-works (that is, at the point of production).  Lower transport costs would enable an exporter to show a
higher ex-works price to challenge an accusation of dumping.15
again, as the major obstacles they faced had been removed: anti-dumping
duties had expired while the case was pending, and exclusionary practices of
the major European producers were simultaneously being prohibited.
16
ANSAC’s proposed entry would bring only one new supplier into the market,
resulting in a different outcome as compared to a situation in which some or all
of its members entered individually.  It would be more likely to collude with
existing suppliers, and would foreclose the possibility of European buyers
obtaining their supplies from individual ANSAC members. ANSAC’s
demonstration that the price would actually be higher than that of its individual
members showed that any economies of scale obtained in shipping were not
going to be shared with European consumers, as required for an exemption
under 85(3).  Nor was the joint marketing arrangement necessary for the
economies claimed for collective distribution, for the Commission had indicated
that it would be prepared to give an exemption to an agreement limited to
storage and transport facilities.  In conclusion, the ANSAC agreement infringed
Article 85(1), an exemption under 85(3) was refused, and the agreement could
not be implemented in the EEC. But the story had a happy ending, at least for
ANSAC and for European consumers: The U.S. producers subsequently
formed another Webb-Pomerene association, the American-European Soda
Ash Shipping Association (AESASA), presumably satisfying the Commission’s
requirements, specifically for exports to the EEC.
17
B.  India
India’s Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act of 1969 (now
replaced by the 2002 Competition Act) borrowed heavily from the UK
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956. Certain types of agreements, including
those relating to price fixing and market sharing, were listed in Section 33 of the
Indian Act, and were required to be registered with the MRTP Commission.
                                                          
16 The Commission simultaneously imposed substantial fines on the major European suppliers, ICI and Solvay,
for exclusionary conduct in giving rebates to their customers that would deter them from obtaining supplies from
rival suppliers. The three Decisions (pertaining to Solvay, ICI, and ANSAC) contained substantially identical
paragraphs describing the product, the market, and the competitors. ICI and Solvay appealed and got the
decisions annulled on procedural grounds in 1995 by the Court of the First Instance, and the Commission’s
appeals were dismissed in April 2000 by the European Court of Justice. However, the Commission readopted
the original decisions, almost verbatim, in December of that year: see Official Journal 2003 L10, pp.10-50.
17 The annual reports of ANSAC and AESASA, with their almost identical membership lists, are available at
www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/webbpomerene, accessed on August 6, 2003.16
Section 37 empowered the Commission to inquire into any restrictive trade
practice (RTP), whether registered or not, and order its discontinuance or
modification if it were found to be “prejudicial to the public interest”.  According
to Section 38, an RTP would be “deemed to be prejudicial to the public interest”
unless the Commission was satisfied that one or more of several specified
circumstances (referred to in case law, as in the UK, as “gateways”) prevailed.
It also required the balancing of these circumstances against any harms
caused by the RTP.  Although “efficiency” was not explicitly one of the
gateways, Section 38(b) allowed the respondent to argue that removal of the
restriction would deprive buyers of “specific and substantial benefits”, while a
minimal effect on competition could be pleaded under 38(h).
In September 1996, ANSAC attempted to ship a consignment of soda
ash to India. The Alkali Manufacturers Association of India (AMAI), whose
members included the major Indian producers, filed a complaint with India’s
MRTP Commission, alleging infringement of several sections of the MRTP Act,
including cartelization.  The Commission imposed an ex parte interim injunction
on ANSAC, restraining it from cartelized exports to India.  In June 1997, the
Commission rejected ANSAC's petition for vacating the injunction.
18  Quoting
from the ANSAC membership agreement, it held that ANSAC was prima facie a
cartel which was carrying out part of its trade practices in India, giving the
Commission jurisdiction under Section 14 of the MRTP Act, even though the
cartel itself was formed outside India.  The Commission also noted that the
1990 orders of its EC counterpart, holding that the ANSAC agreement was
restrictive of competition, “have a persuasive effect in the instant case” (p. 307).
ANSAC’s pleading of the gateways under Sections 38(b) and (h) could be
considered at the appropriate stage of enquiry, but the Commission did record
the kind of efficiencies that ANSAC was claiming:
Among the reasons why export sales by ANSAC are more
advantageous than export sales by individual members are:
(a) access to larger supplies of soda ash, (b) ability to offer
uninterrupted supply to overseas customers, (c) ability to pool
                                                          
18  Alkali Manufacturers’ Association of India vs American Natural Soda Ash Corporation (ANSAC) and others, 1997(5) CTJ 288
(MRTPC).17
risks, (d) the flexibility of a single dedicated export staff with
expertise in the area of exports, (e) the capacity of minimizing
distribution costs and (f) improved access to Government
assistance, where available. (p.300, para 44)
The Commission confirmed its earlier injunction, on the grounds that ANSAC
was prima facie a cartel.  It clarified, however, that the American firms could
export to India individually, dismissing ANSAC’s contention that they were
unable to do so without the efficiencies provided by the joint marketing
arrangement.  Here the Commission referred (in para 74) to the EC
Commission’s observations on their ability to compete amongst themselves
and with the European producers.  It went on to assert that the claimed
efficiencies were not necessary for supplying the Indian market, but only
afforded the American producers a greater advantage than they could obtain
individually. This ignored a crucial difference between the Indian situation and
the European one, which the Commission had noted while summarising
ANSAC’s defence: the American firms had not previously supplied the Indian
market (para 34).
In its interim order in March 2000, the MRTPC went over much the same
ground, reiterating that ANSAC was prima facie a cartel, notwithstanding it had
a legal identity distinct from that of its members.  ANSAC then appealed to the
Indian Supreme Court, which in a far-reaching verdict delivered in July 2002,
overturned the MRTPC orders.  It did not go into the allegation of cartelization,
but instead held that the wording of the MRTP Act did not give it any extra-
territorial operation. The Commission could therefore not take action against
foreign cartels or the pricing of exports to India, nor could it restrict imports.
Action could be taken only if an anti-competitive agreement involving an Indian
party could be proved, and that too only after the goods had been imported into
India.
19  The only remedy available to the domestic manufacturers was an anti-
dumping duty.  The Court observed in passing that prima facie, ANSAC’s
                                                          
19 Haridas Exports vs All India Float Glass Manufacturers’ Association, (2002) 6 SCC 600. The
two parties named in this case were involved in another dispute involving similar issues; the
ANSAC appeal was joined with it for hearing and judgment.  I discuss the wider implications of
this judgment, and Indian competition policy in relation to international trade, in greater detail in
Bhattacharjea (2003a and 2003b).18
contention that it was the Indian producers who had formed a cartel did “merit
consideration, perhaps in another case”.
Although a Supreme Court ruling would normally have closed the matter,
the story did not end there.  The verdict was announced while a new
Competition Bill was pending in the Indian Parliament.  In December 2002
when it was being passed, the government moved an amendment inserting a
new sub-section 33(2) that would allow the Competition Commission (the
designated successor of the MRTP Commission) to grant a temporary
injunction restraining any party from importing goods, if it could be established
that such imports would contravene the Act’s substantive provisions.  However,
another amendment was also passed, exempting efficiency-enhancing joint
ventures from the Act’s prohibition of hard core cartels. The new Competition
Act is yet to take effect at the time of writing, because the Indian government
has announced that the first year of its operation would be used for competition
advocacy and education, with its cartel provisions coming into effect only in the
second year.  It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the domestic industry
will again try to obtain an injunction against imports from ANSAC under the new
Act, whether ANSAC (which described itself as a joint venture in the South
African case to be discussed next) will employ the efficiency defence, and
whether the new Commission will accept it.
C.  South Africa
20
Botswana is second only to the United States as a producer of natural soda
ash, most of which is exported, with neighbouring South Africa being a major
buyer.  In October 1999, Botswana Ash (Pty) Ltd. (Botash) filed an application
for interim relief with the South African Competition Commission, alleging that
ANSAC was infringing the sections of the Competition Act that prohibited
agreements involving price-fixing and market sharing.  The Commission, after
conducting an investigation and finding that a prohibited practice had been
established, referred the matter to the Competition Tribunal.  In the ensuing
interlocutory proceedings, apart from raising procedural and jurisdictional
                                                          
20 The following account is based on the judgments of the South African Competition Tribunal,
decidedcases/doc/49CRAPR00-1.doc and 49CRAPR00-2.doc and Competition Appeals Court,
Case12/CAC/Dec01, all downloaded from www.comptrib.co.za on 6 June 2003.19
objections, ANSAC argued that even if price fixing or market sharing could be
established, a ‘purposive’ reading of the relevant sections of the Act (i.e. taking
legislative intent into account) would allow it to put up a defence that its
agreement resulted in an efficiency or pro-competitive benefit that outweighed
its negative effects.  In March 2001, the Tribunal overruled all these arguments.
On the admissibility of the efficiency defence, which is what concerns us here,
it held that legislative purpose would be relevant only if the statute were
ambiguous.  But Section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act explicitly condemned
price fixing and market sharing as illegal per se, as distinct from 4(1)(a) which
allowed an efficiency defence for horizontal agreements that adversely
impacted competition. Neither a textual analysis, nor a purposive reading, nor
considerations of public policy or international comity, admitted of any other
interpretation.
Later the same year, ANSAC tried to introduce the beneficial effects of
its agreement before the Tribunal in a more roundabout manner.  It contended
that it needed to establish these effects in order to dispute the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction, because the ‘effects’ doctrine contained in Section 3(1) pertained
only to deleterious effects on competition.  This too was dismissed by the
Tribunal, again on the basis of a plain reading of the Act.  ANSAC’s appeal on
both these issues (the admissibility of the efficiency defence, and the effects
test being applicable only to negative effects), along with other procedural
objections, was subsequently dismissed by the Competition Appeals Court.
Noting various provisions of the ANSAC membership agreement, the Court
dryly observed “It is therefore no surprise that Ansac’s activities attracted the
attention of the European authorities” (para 26).  It upheld the Tribunal’s
decision that the clear wording of Section 4(1)(b) made price fixing illegal per
se, without the possible extenuating circumstances allowed in EU law.
Nonetheless, it did record the nature of the efficiencies that ANSAC was trying
to argue, which are worth quoting in order to lay the foundation for the
theoretical discussion in the next section:
[T]he appellants seek to place evidence before the Tribunal to
show that Ansac is a legitimate joint venture whose purpose it is20
to pool costs and resources so as to make it possible for them to
trade competitively within exports markets where there are
barriers to entry and significant risks. They seek to demonstrate
that by virtue of pooling costs and resources Ansac has been
able to appoint independent sales and distribution staff dedicated
solely to sales and services of customers, has been able to
negotiate and obtain decreased freight and stevedoring charges
and has entered into a variety of cost-reducing overseas
warehousing and distribution agreements.  The result of this is
that Ansac has achieved reductions in marketing and distribution
costs and can undertake competitive sales to new countries and
overseas markets including those with high logistical and political
risks and offer customers worldwide the enhanced reliability and
efficiency made possible by increased volumes and the back-up
supply commitments of US soda ash producers. (Para 27)
D.  Venezuela
21
In the earlier three cases, ANSAC tried unsuccessfully to convince the relevant
competition authorities that it was not a cartel but a trading company or joint
venture. In Venezuela, its problems took a different turn.  In 1998, a
Venezuelan distributor named Proquim alleged that the cartel, behaving like a
monopolist, was charging a much higher price from Proquim than from its own
distributor, and also imposing a clause in its contracts with its customers that
required them to notify ANSAC if they received a better offer from other
suppliers.  This ‘evergreen’ or ‘English’ clause, and refusal to deal, are
regarded in Venezuela and some other jurisdictions as an abuse of market
dominance, because they can serve as an exclusionary practice designed to
keep out rivals. (Similar clauses had formed part of the EC Commission’s
decisions against ICI and Solvay, in the twin cases referred to in n.16 above).
Procompetencia, the Venezuelan competition agency, decided against ANSAC,
ordering it to stop the malpractice and sell to Proquim, an order with which
                                                          
21 Because  the  documents  of  the  competition  agency  were  available  on  the  Internet  only  in Spanish,  I  have
relied  on  a  case  study  entitled  “International  Business  Ethics”  prepared  for the Katz School of Business,
University of Pittsburgh, posted at : www.pitt.edu/~ethics/Venezuela/firm.html, downloaded on 23 June, 2003.21
ANSAC complied.  In this case, it was the complainants who apparently
claimed that ANSAC could obtain economies of scale in shipping costs, which
gave it a dominant position.
E.  Comparative Assessment
Looking back at the four cases, notice the diversity in the motives of the
initiating parties.  In the EEC, it was ANSAC itself that sought an exemption
(although its European rivals might well have brought a complaint if it had not);
in India an injunction was sought by an association of the domestic
manufacturers who were threatened by competition from ANSAC; in South
Africa the complainant was the incumbent dominant supplier belonging to a
neighbouring country; and in Venezuela the case was filed by a trading
company that sought to sell ANSAC’s product. In every case, the putative
efficiencies of a joint marketing arrangement were raised, but again with
different motives: in the first three jurisdictions, they arose out of ANSAC’s
attempt to claim an efficiency defence for a practice that restricted competition
(and additionally to escape anti-dumping duties in the EEC), while in Venezuela
the efficiency argument was used against ANSAC to establish that it had a
dominant position.  The relevance of these efficiencies in deciding the cases
also differed between jurisdictions.  In the EEC, they were considered and
rejected; in India and South Africa they were noted but not considered, as the
per se illegality of a cartel was enough to indict ANSAC (and the competition
law’s lack of extra-territorial jurisdiction was enough to save it on appeal in
India).  Only in Venezuela did the efficiencies seem to carry some weight,
although the case was ultimately decided on the issue of exclusionary
contracts.
The efficiencies that ANSAC claimed were also slightly different in each
jurisdiction.  But a consolidated list provides a fairly comprehensive idea of the
kind of advantages such cartels might have, and extends the present
discussion to export cartels in general.  Using the analytical categories familiar
to economics, we get the following taxonomy.
1.  Saving on variable costs of transportation, warehousing and handling, by
being able to negotiate better rates for larger volumes.22
2.  Saving on the fixed costs of market research and setting up and maintaining
networks and facilities for shipping, customs clearance, storage, marketing
and distribution, and liaison with government officials where necessary.
These are likely to be specific to each destination, and individual producers
might find that their volumes are too small to justify incurring such costs.  Or
they could avoid unnecessary duplication by centralizing these functions in
a common agency.
3.  Pooling of risks: although not spelt out in any of the case reports, this
appears to involve two separate considerations.  First, access to the
production facilities of many producers yields a more reliable source of
supply, resulting in the cartel being better placed to meet orders.  Second,
common marketing gives each producer a share in a diversified portfolio of
buyers, spreading the risks of non-payment by buyers, demand slumps, or
disruption in deliveries caused by political or natural events in particular
markets.
This list overlaps substantially with that of the OETCA’s promotional literature.
Clearly, advantages under 1 and 3 can only be obtained through the setting up
of a CSA, and not through the looser kind of cartels that figure in economic
theory.
5.  Economic Analysis
Firms, of course, have an incentive to eliminate competition even if there are no
real efficiencies to be had. So do their governments, as we saw from the brief
review of the relevant theory in section 2, provided there is no adverse impact
on the domestic market. The following questions are then relevant from the
perspective of policymakers in the importing countries: Are these real
efficiencies, or are they just a convenient excuse to avoid the strictures of the
competition authorities?  Second, if they are real, are they available to firms
that do not join the cartel or defect from it? Third, should they be taken into
account by the competition agencies of the importing countries, tempering their
condemnation of hard core cartels?  And finally, if the verdict nonetheless goes
against the cartel, what would be the appropriate remedy?23
A. Efficiencies
It might seem that the answer to the very first question, and thus the
subsequent ones, requires familiarity with the conditions of each industry, but
economic theory provides a fairly simple and robust answer.  In its anti-
competitive aspect, a cartel (and certainly one that takes the form of a joint
venture or CSA) is isomorphic to a horizontal merger.  And it is well known that
in order to be profitable, such a merger must involve either a large proportion of
the suppliers (and barriers to the entry of new ones), or significant cost
reductions.  This is because output restriction by the merging firms provides
free rider benefits in the form of raising a “price umbrella” for non-participants,
and their increase in output can undermine the profitability of the merger.  A
cartel of the producers in a single country, unless it dominates the world
market, is unlikely to fulfil the first condition.  Therefore if such an arrangement
is observed, it must result in cost reductions.  Its impact on competition is
therefore ambiguous, with its sales restricting effect pulling against the cost
reduction effect.
Linking the question of efficiencies to the cartel’s market share was
suggested by antitrust scholar and judge Robert Bork (1966) in the context of
American antitrust laws.  Bork argued that a horizontal market division or price-
fixing agreement should be treated as lawful if it could be shown to be
“ancillary” to a “contract integration” between the firms, whose primary purpose
was something other than output restriction.  It had to be demonstrated that the
agreement was no broader than necessary to achieve that purpose, and that
the producers’ combined market shares made output restriction unlikely.  The
EU’s exemption criteria under Article 81(3) are informed by a similar logic.
While the U.S. generally implements the Sherman Act as a per se prohibition of
cartels other than export cartels, there are exceptional cases in which its
Supreme Court has considered a so-called “benign cartel” defence under a
Rule of Reason, involving efficiency arguments (Posner 2002, pp. 29-32).  An
export cartel commanding a small share of the world market, and limiting its
activities to marketing, could enter a defence of this kind in the importing
jurisdiction.24
One possibly important case, relevant to developing country imports, in
which this reasoning may not hold is when the exporting country has a low
share of the world market, but a high share of a particular country’s market.
There is considerable evidence that many small developing countries trade
disproportionately with the European countries that once colonized them, even
decades after achieving formal independence (Rauch 1999). There seem to be
informational, cultural and institutional barriers to entry by suppliers from other
countries; or possibly the fixed costs of establishing the necessary marketing
and distribution networks are large relative to market size.  In such cases, an
agreement by European firms to fix prices or rig bids would be purely anti-
competitive, because these barriers would prevent free riding by suppliers from
other countries. True, export associations are not geared to particular national
markets; it is more likely that collusion takes place on a case-by-case basis
taking advantage of the implicit exclusion for exports in EU competition law. Of
course, more research is needed to support this admittedly speculative
hypothesis.
Further on the subject of free riding, and in answer to the second
question raised above, the nature of an export cartel is such that there are
powerful incentives for other producers of the same product within the same
country to join such an arrangement.  Precisely because a single-country
export cartel is unlikely to be able to raise the price significantly in foreign
markets (and might in fact depress it, if the efficiency benefits are significant)
there is much less scope for non-participants benefiting from the participants’
price umbrella.  Nor, because of the nature of the efficiency benefits, can the
non-participants hope to free ride on them.  (Contrast the possible benefits
listed at the end of the preceding section with joint research and development,
whose benefits can spill over to non-participants.)  Production costs of those
who do not join, on the other hand, are likely to be similar to those of the
members, since they belong to the same country. This will put non-members at
a competitive disadvantage in respect of exports. The benefits of the cartel will
therefore induce non-participants to join in, or be displaced from export
markets.  And once they become members, the same arguments dissuade
them from defecting, which is the bane of orthodox cartels.  At the same time,25
the efficiency benefits listed above (except perhaps Type 3) are by their very
nature specific to each exporting country, and cannot be obtained by other
nations’ suppliers, even if they could join in.  Thus, such an arrangement is
likely to be confined to each exporting country.
To sum up the foregoing analysis, from the point of view of non-
members, whether belonging to the same country or other countries, export
cartels yield limited free rider benefits on the revenue side, and no such
positive externalities on the cost side.  By enhancing the competitiveness of
members, the efficiency benefits may in fact result in negative pecuniary
externalities being inflicted on non-members.  The cost benefits are specific to
exports and arise only within and not across countries.  In some or all these
respects, export cartels are different from other types of inter-firm collaboration,
such as joint advertising, lobbying, training or research activities, or true
international cartels that include producers from many countries. The incentive
structure of export cartels thus makes them a distinct economic category,
independent of their membership rules as well as the legal regime in force in
their country of residence.
The third question, relating to the importing country’s assessment of an
export cartel, is not as easy to answer. We measure social welfare in the usual
way as the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus (that is, profits in
excess of the normal return to capital), and tariff revenue accruing to the
government.  There is of course a vast literature on the efficiency defence of a
domestic merger, following from Williamson (1968), exploring the trade-off
between increased profits and reduced consumer surplus.  Applying this
analysis to export cartels requires two substantial modifications.  First, the
nature of efficiencies is different, and a cartel, even if it takes the form of a
CSA, cannot secure all the cost savings that would accrue from a merger.  For
example, it cannot reallocate human and physical capital optimally across
production units, and it will incur transactions costs in dealing with them, which
could have been avoided had they merged.  Second, when the cartel is foreign-
owned, its profits are irrelevant. Instead, we need to evaluate the effect of
foreign cartelization on domestic consumers, producers and tariff revenues.
The analysis can be conducted in two steps: first we determine the likely effect26
on exports, taking into account the nature of efficiencies, and then the impact of
this change on the different components of social welfare in the importing
country.
The result of the first step hinges on whether the sales-restricting effect
of the cartel outweighs its cost-reducing effects, that is, whether it promotes or
retards exports as compared to a situation in which the members operated
independently. Clearly, at least the Indian and Botswanian complainants saw
ANSAC as a competitive threat, and hence believed that it was on the whole
export promoting. But the European Commission seems to have regarded
ANSAC as anti-competitive, unless it divorced its marketing functions from its
pricing and market-sharing policies. Again, some elementary insights from
theory are helpful in determining the net effect of cartelization on exports.  Here
we need to distinguish between foreign cartels that are new entrants into the
market, and those whose members have earlier operated there in their
individual capacities.  Taking the case of new entry first, the very fact that the
foreign firms were not supplying the market earlier makes it likely that the
efficiencies claimed by the cartel are what enables them to do so, and thus an
injunction to force them to compete individually is as good as an import
prohibition. The choice then is between some new entry and none.
If the foreign firms were already active in the domestic market prior to
cartelization, the situation is more complicated.  Referring to the taxonomy at
the end of Section 4 above, if the efficiency gains were of types 2 or 3, they
would benefit the firms but would not have any effect on the outcome in an
export market where they (the firms) were already present. Here only the anti-
competitive effect of cartelization would be relevant, and an injunction requiring
them to resume exporting individually is feasible for the firms, in light of their
previously demonstrated ability to do so.  If, on the other hand, cartelization
reduces the per unit costs of supplying the export market (Type 1 above), then
regardless of market structure, standard theory would lead us to expect a
positive impact on the level of exports, pulling against the sales-restraining
effect of cartelization. The literature on cost-reducing horizontal mergers is
again suggestive. Assuming Cournot behaviour by the merged entity and its
remaining competitors, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) show that output cannot rise27
if the merger only allows for reallocation of production across the formerly
independent firms with differing cost levels.  In the present context, this would
be analogous to a CSA sourcing its supplies from different members so as to
minimize costs.
22  They also show that output will fall unless cost reductions on
account of economies of scale or synergies between the merging firms are
substantial. Even with such efficiencies, a decline in output is more likely, the
larger the market share of the merging firms, the smaller the industry elasticity
of demand, and if merger makes industry conduct more collusive (which was
the European Commission’s concern in its treatment of ANSAC).
B. Effects on Importing Countries
Turning to the effect of changes in exports on welfare in the importing country,
market structure is important.  The evidence on cartels suggests that they are
found mainly in oligopolistic industries producing homogeneous products,
which makes it more than likely that the import-competing industry (if one
exists) is also oligopolistic, especially in developing countries.
23  If there is no
domestic production, there is no producer surplus, and we get an unambiguous
answer: if the cartel decreases exports, it reduces welfare in the importing
country by hurting consumers.  If there are oligopolistic domestic producers,
however, they will benefit from the “price umbrella” of the foreign cartel, at the
expense of domestic consumers, and we have a trade-off.
After obtaining the likely direction of change in the output of the merging
firms (‘insiders’), Farrell and Shapiro then treat it as exogenous and derive its
effect on consumer surplus plus the profits of ‘outsiders’ (non-merging firms).
Although their paper was concerned with welfare effects within the merging
firms’ home country, their approach is useful in the present context.  This is
because if all producers of a good in a country form an export cartel (which I
argued is likely), and it has no effect on home consumers (which is essential to
gain exemption from the home competition authorities), then this external
welfare effect falls entirely on the importing countries.  It turns out that a small
reduction in ‘insider’ output has a positive external effect if and only if the
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23 The empirical studies surveyed in Lee (1992) show that industrial structures are much more
concentrated in developing as compared to developed countries, controlling for industry-specific effects.28
weighted sum of the outsiders’ market shares exceeds the insiders’ market
share, where the weights are a parameter that captures firms’ response to
exogenous output changes, and is a function of demand and cost conditions.  A
negative external effect is more likely, the larger the insiders’ market share
relative to that of the outsiders, and the smaller the latter’s output response.
We are, however, more interested in welfare effects in a single importing
country.  In Bhattacharjea (2002a), building on several earlier contributions to
the oligopoly trade literature, I demonstrated that for free trade and a given
number of domestic firms, social welfare exhibits a J-shaped relationship in the
number of foreign firms, first dropping below the autarky level for limited foreign
entry, and then rising above it for more substantial foreign penetration.  Foreign
penetration can also be reinterpreted in terms of the total volume of imports, or
their market share, as long as the domestic firms treat foreign supply as
exogenous.  It does not matter whether changes in foreign supply emanate
from one exporting country or several.
The J-curve is derived under free trade, but the 1980s theoretical
literature on “strategic trade policy” showed that if foreign supply is imperfectly
competitive (which it must be, if we are dealing with cartels), some tariff is
optimal in maximizing welfare, but is almost impossible to calculate empirically.
What we do know is that it is likely to be moderate in magnitude: typically in the
low double-digits in percentage terms, but higher if the prices of inputs used by
the import-competing industry are above their social cost on account of market
imperfections (Levy and Nolan, 1992). Further, for linear demand and constant
costs, the optimal tariff is inversely related to the number of foreign firms.  And
it can be shown that if the tariff is adjusted optimally, the J-curve disappears,
and welfare increases monotonically with foreign entry (Bhattacharjea 2002a).
Adapting this result to the present context, welfare will decline if the foreign
cartel restricts its sales and the home government adjusts the tariff rate
appropriately.
C. Remedies
The policy implications of the theoretical results discussed above obviously
depend on the specific circumstances.  If there is no domestic production,29
evaluation of the cartel is relatively simple, as welfare varies directly with
foreign supply.  A cartel whose net effect is to restrict sales is unambiguously
bad.  With domestic oligopoly, under free trade, if the foreign cartel is a new
entrant, is the major source of imports, and takes only a small share of the
domestic market, then welfare will decline when it enters.  As long as we
remain  on  the  left-hand  branch  of the J-curve, welfare will decline even
more if the cartel members are forced to compete individually and therefore
increase their sales.  As I argued above, however, they would probably
withdraw altogether from the domestic market, if the efficiencies of joint
marketing were what allowed them to enter in the first place.  Such withdrawal,
or otherwise a prohibition of imports, would actually enhance the importing
country’s welfare.
 24
If the firms constituting the cartel were already present in the market, an
injunction to disband the cartel would presumably not compel them to withdraw,
as they were already competitive even without the efficiencies provided by
collusion.  In this case the welfare effect of restoring the non-collusive outcome
would be ambiguous, depending on which branch of the J-curve we are on.  On
the left branch where cartelization would have raised welfare, an injunction
would reduce it again, and import prohibition would actually increase it further.
On the other hand, if imports already had a large share of the domestic market,
then we are more likely to be on the right-hand branch of the J-curve, where
welfare varies directly with foreign supply.  If the foreign cartel restricts its
sales, home welfare decreases, and an import prohibition decreases it further.
In this case an injunction to disband the cartel will restore the original welfare
level, as presumably the firms can supply the market individually as they were
doing earlier.  Departing from free trade, the same is true if the tariff is close to
the optimal level (moderately high for limited import penetration, or low for
substantial penetration). No policy implications can be inferred for the
combination of high tariffs and substantial foreign penetration, but that
                                                          
24 Other foreign suppliers who were not members of the cartel would of course take the
opportunity to expand their exports, but unless ‘conjectural variations’ are exactly minus unity,
this would not fully compensate for the cartel being shut out – and it can be shown that a
conjectural variation of this magnitude would have resulted in a perfectly competitive outcome
in the first place.  Bhattacharjea (2002a) shows how output is affected by changes in the
number of foreign firms under Cournot competition.30
particular combination is unlikely to be observed. Even for the other cases, the
crucial level of imports at which the J-curve reaches its trough, as well as the
optimal tariff, depend quite sensitively on market structure, cost and demand
parameters, and will be almost impossible to calculate in practice.  These
results should be taken only as a rough guide to the likely welfare effects of
cartelization for very large and very small levels of import penetration.
An injunction against the cartel, if carried out, at best restores the pre-
cartel outcome, and neither compensates for the damage that was done, nor
deters collusion in the future.  A heavy fine contributes to both objectives, and
also adds teeth to the injunction.  But it is difficult to see how a fine can be
enforced if the firms have no assets in the fine-imposing jurisdiction.  The threat
of an import prohibition might be used to induce the indicted firms to assist with
the investigation, and to abide by the injunction and pay the fine in the event of
an adverse judgment.  Game theorists would argue that if the import prohibition
worsens domestic welfare, the threat is not credible.  But the protectionist
tendencies of most government agencies, as amply illustrated in the ANSAC
cases, would give them a certain “reputation for irrationality” that would provide
the necessary credibility.  There is, however, the further problem in small
developing countries that the cartel members will weigh the penalty, which is
usually some multiple of the excess profits earned while the cartel was in force,
against the non-collusive profits they can earn in future.  They may well choose
to abandon the market altogether rather than pay the fine, yielding the same
result as an import prohibition, which we saw is welfare-improving only in
certain cases.  The fine must therefore be suitably moderated, inevitably
weakening its deterrent effect.
An alternative measure, which could be combined with a moderate fine,
would be to impose (or raise) an import duty.  The strategic trade policy
literature showed that the optimal tariff is inversely related to the number of
foreign firms (Brander and Spencer 1984; Bhattacharjea 2002a), the level of
their marginal costs, and the competitiveness of their conduct, as measured by
a conjectural variations parameter (Dixit 1988).  A reduction in any of these can
be said to capture an aspect of foreign cartelization, and therefore to justify a
higher tariff.  Moreover, an optimal tariff does not shut out all imports.  Two31
interesting papers have shown, in models with no consumption in the exporting
country and no production (and linear demand) in the importing country, that a
threat of resorting to such a tariff by the latter might even induce the former to
crack down on its export cartels. In game-theoretic terms, the optimality of the
tariff makes the threat credible: it is in the government’s interest to carry it out.
Cowan (1989) showed in a sequential-moves game that a country deciding the
number of its exporting firms before (and in anticipation of) the importing
country’s optimal tariff response would be better off with a perfectly-competitive
export industry because it would induce free trade on the part of the latter.
More recently, Hoekman and Saggi (2003) show that an agreement in which
the exporting (developed) country prevents cartelization of its industry in
exchange for the importing (developing) country adhering to free trade can be
supported as the equilibrium of a repeated game with simultaneous moves.  If
both governments do not weigh the immediate gains from violating the
agreement too much more than the future benefits of adhering to it, the
agreement is self-enforcing, sustained by credible threats of reverting to non-
cooperative behaviour (non-enforcement of its cartel prohibition by the
developed country; imposition of an optimal tariff by the developing country).
There are several problems with these attractive options, however.
First, the strategic trade literature showed that the tariff formula is extremely
sensitive to the underlying parameters of the model.  In fact, Cowan (1989)
showed that with iso-elastic instead of linear demand, the importing country’s
optimal tariff on a foreign monopolist is negative, i.e. an import subsidy.  Far
from deterring cartelization, this would encourage it !  Also, as the more recent
models of strategic trade policy under asymmetric information have shown,
domestic and foreign firms who are better informed about these crucial
parameters than the government have an incentive to mislead the latter,
resulting in welfare-reducing policies (see the literature cited in Bhattacharjea
2002b).  There is also a problem of fairness: even if the optimal tariff is positive
and raises domestic welfare, it does adversely affect domestic consumers,
adding insult to the injury they have suffered from the cartel.  Ideally, the tariff
revenues (and those from the fine) should be transferred to them, but
identifying those who have been harmed will be virtually impossible.  And32
finally, there remains the original problem of detecting the foreign cartel (or
proving non-enforcement of the cartel prohibition by its government).  In the
concluding section, I suggest a way in which to deal with this vexatious issue.
6. Conclusions
It is disappointing that no unique policy prescription emerges from our analysis;
as usual when we allow for oligopolistic market structures, “it all depends”.
What this paper has done is to offer a starting point, indicating the various facts
that need to be considered in determining whether a foreign export cartel is
beneficial or harmful to the importing country.  Among them are: whether the
cartel is a new entrant; the nature of the efficiencies it claims; the market
structure, demand elasticity, degree of import penetration, and prevailing level
of tariffs in the importing country.  Clearly, neither a per se prohibition nor a
passive acceptance of efficiency arguments is appropriate, and hence an
international agreement that takes either of these two extreme positions is
inadvisable.  We are led inescapably to treatment under a rule of reason for
each individual case, and a qualified argument for imposing fines and raising
import duties on offending firms.
The problem, of course, is that competition agencies in most countries
would not have the expertise to undertake such reasoning, nor the extra-
territorial reach required for discovery of evidence and enforcement of
penalties.  The proponents of a competition policy agreement at the WTO were
never willing to offer anything more than technical assistance and limited
voluntary cooperation, and are likely to be even less forthcoming now that their
efforts have been thwarted.  Absent an international enforcement authority, or
developed countries’ willingness to start prosecuting their own export cartels
(as suggested by Hoekman and Mavroidis 2003 and Singh 2003), there is little
that developing countries can hope to gain on this front by simply enacting
competition laws, as suggested by the proponents.
In  this  context, I  would  like  to  suggest  a  novel approach, based on
parallels  with  anti-dumping  (AD)  procedures, that could lighten the
evidentiary burden of prosecuting both multi-country international cartels and
single-country export cartels. The Uruguay Round AD agreement allows much33
greater latitude for countries to address dumping than do standard competition
law approaches to discriminatory or predatory pricing. In recent debates on the
interaction between trade and competition policy, many scholars argued that
application of antitrust standards would help to curb the abuse of AD
procedures – but developed countries consistently refused to accept this
suggestion.
25  The relaxed standards of AD could, with much greater
justification, be applied to foreign cartels whose overcharging is after all the
mirror image of dumping. (Indeed, it is sometimes referred to as “reverse
dumping”).  For example, instead of requiring proof of a price-fixing conspiracy,
the enforcement agency could be required to demonstrate that the price
exceeds some “normal value”.
 26  As with AD, this could be assessed on the
basis of best information available regarding the firms’ costs, or the prices they
charge in their own or other markets.
27  Other leaves that could be taken from
the AD book include norms for defining a “like product” (to avoid penalising
firms which sell different varieties in different countries); retroactive
assessment; and provisional measures such as requiring bonds or advance
deposits from respondent firms while the case is pending.  With the
qualifications expressed at the end of the preceding section, the penalty could
include both a fine and an “anti-reverse-dumping” duty.  Like an AD duty, this
would be discriminatory and firm-specific, and possibly in excess of the
country’s bound tariff rate.  This would be justifiable on welfare grounds, unlike
most AD duties, which are blatantly abused.
Obviously, some provisions of the AD agreement would not be
applicable, such as the standing given to domestic producers as complainants,
or the requirement that they prove that they have been injured by the dumped
imports. Although reverse dumping places domestic consumers in a symmetric
position, they cannot be expected to initiate action or shoulder the burden of
                                                          
25 See Hoekman and Mavroidis (2003, p.15) and Bhattacharjea (2003a, pp.219-20) and the
references cited there for details.
26 Even for domestic antitrust enforcement, no less an authority than Posner (2001, ch. 3) has
argued, with careful regard to practicability, for a move away from the traditional approach
based on uncovering conspiracies towards one based on economic evidence of collusion,
including price discrimination and regional price variations.
27 Evenett (2003, p.96) has argued that international cartels charge lower prices in countries
with active competition agencies.  To the extent this is true, the price comparison suggested34
proof. Instead, the inquiry could be triggered by an abnormal rise in import
prices, registration of the cartel in its home country, or by investigations being
carried out against the same firms in other jurisdictions.  Evidence of this nature
could even be deemed sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of
cartelization, reversing the burden of proof.
Like AD petitions, this procedure would not require the evidentiary
standards (and hence cooperation from the respondents and their
governments) of an antitrust case.  Countries whose competition agencies are
denied such cooperation could consider unilaterally applying these relaxed
standards to foreign firms.  Although the Dispute Settlement Panel in the 1997
Kodak—Fuji case held that national competition laws were subject to the core
WTO principle of National Treatment, discrimination of this kind cannot be said
to be trade-restricting, and would arguably not constitute an infringement of
GATT obligations.
28  (This point might be worth settling in a test case that led to
formal dispute settlement proceedings.)  If the issue of a multilateral agreement
on competition policy were to be revived, despite its apparent demise at
Cancun, developing countries could press for one along the lines suggested
above.  This would give them a better chance of taking on foreign cartels than
the agreement envisaged by the proponents, while laying down procedures,
rules of evidence, and permissible penalties so as to safeguard the other WTO
principles of transparency and procedural fairness, and prevent protectionist
abuse.
A more audacious proposal, particularly appropriate for products like
pharmaceuticals and speciality chemicals whose producers are notorious for
their cartel activities, would be a WTO agreement on competition policy that
would allow members to suspend the offending firms’ rights under the TRIPS
                                                                                                                                                                        
here would allow agencies in poor countries to free ride on the activities of their better equipped
and experienced peers, without their explicit cooperation.
28 Bhattacharjea (1998) adapted a standard regulatory mechanism to the problem of optimal
policy towards a foreign monopolist (which could be a special case of a foreign export cartel)
whose costs are unknown to the regulator, showing how the optimal mechanism could be
implemented by making the monopolist choose from a menu consisting of a per-unit tariff or
import subsidy and a fixed payment. The paper proved that such a mechanism maximizes
expected consumer surplus (and is thus trade-promoting on average), and that the
government’s expected revenue is zero (so that, again on average, it is not “a taxation of
imports or exports for fiscal purposes”, which would violate Article VIII of the GATT).  Although35
agreement, perhaps by issuing compulsory licenses for any of their products
protected by patent. After all, the GATT allows countries to retaliate against
other  members who are found to violate one agreement by suspending
concessions under other agreements. Since the retaliation usually takes the
form of increasing tariffs on a range of the violating country’s exports, it is likely
to inflict a welfare loss on the retaliating country itself, and also on exporters
who had nothing to do with the violation. Cross-agreement retaliation, applied
to the offending firms in a cartel case in the form of suspension of their patent
rights, would not involve self-injury by the retaliating country, and be precisely
targetted at the beneficiaries of the violative conduct.  It would also be
appropriate in light of the constraints on collecting monetary fines. More
generally, the GATT/WTO framework, as it stands, confers valuable rights
(market access, intellectual property protection) on firms, with no reciprocal
obligations. Suspension of those rights would be an appropriate penalty for
anti-competitive behaviour.  If nothing else, the debate would hold up a mirror
to the many flaws in the AD and TRIPS agreements.
                                                                                                                                                                        
such a mechanism is too sophisticated for real-world trade policy, the so-called Revelation
Principle ensures that it serves as a benchmark for the best that can be achieved.36
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